Abstract: It is natural to see political philosophyast he domain, par excellence, of collective action and collective obligation. It is therefores urprising that the notion of collective obligation rarely assumesc entre-stagew ithin the subject. ElsewhereIhave argued that we have good reasons for acceptingt he existence of global collective obligations -in other words, collective obligations which fall on the world'spopulation as awhole. HereIshall arguethat in manysituations, forward-lookingglobal obligations give rise to an obligation on individuals to work towards bringingi nto existencea nd support an institutional system which will enable their obligations to be met.Call such an obligation the 'Obligation to PromoteSatisfactory Global Institutions'.Ishallalso examine asignificant challenget ot his line of argument,w hich Ic all the 'Pluralist Challenge'.
1I ntroduction
Questions about distributive justicevary in their focus along two distinct dimensions. We can lookatdistributive justiceassomething which operates on avariety of different scales: within particularl ocal institutions, at the level of the state and perhaps also at the global level. We can also distinguish between questions about how much (if anything) each individual is owed as am atter of justice, and questions about the kindsofinstitution which we might put in place in order to ensure that individuals receive what they deserve and to take remedial action when they do not.HereIshall be concerned with questions at the global and institutional level: questions about the kinds of institution which we might need to ensure an equitable distribution of the world'sr esources,a nd with the duties thati ndividuals have to support such institutions.
Ishall arguethat individuals have aduty to support certain kinds of institution involved in the distribution of goods. Since these dutiesarise out of consideration of the rights of others we should seethem as dutiesofdistributive justice. SecondlyIshall be discussing how ac ertain kind of moral burden, which falls on all of us collectively,s hould be shared among the various members of the world'spopulation.² The notion of collective obligation will playacentral role in my argument.
2C ollective obligation as ak ey notion in politicalp hilosophy
It is natural to think that political philosophyi sc oncerned with reflection on some of the ways in which groups of human beingsc ome togethert oc onfront common problems: in other words, with the domain of collective action. So it seems surprising thatt he notiono fc ollective obligation rarelya ssumes centrestageinnormative political philosophy. If thereare, or can be, collective obligations, then these are constraints on the kinds of collective actioni nw hich we mayp ermissiblye ngage. Beyond this, considerations about collective obligations mayplayacentral role in demarcatingthe form thatlegitimate political organization ought to take. One obstacle to allowing the notion of collective obligation acentral role in political philosophyi st hat the relationship between claims about collective responsibilitya nd anyconstraints or requirements thatt hey might impose on the actionso fi ndividuals is often obscure.³ This point is familiar in discussions of backward-looking judgmentsa bout collective responsibility.S uppose the citizens of the United Kingdom bear,collectively,some responsibility for the policies pursued by its government overseas, and in particularf or its participation in illegal acts of war in Iraq. It is unclear what responsibility lies with particular individuals who might have opposed thatw ar,a ctively and strenuously; those who voted for partiesw hich did not support the war; those who reached the ageofadulthood while the war was being conducted, and so on.⁴ Similar points applytoforward-looking political obligation. Suppose we think the present populationo ft he planet has ac ollective obligation to mitigate the effects of world- Ia mg rateful to Stephen Snyder for emphasising this point to me in correspondence.  Other reasons,which Is hall not discuss here, might include the suspicion that the notion of collective obligation is incoherent and the idea that claims about collective obligation arei n some sense reducible to claims about individual obligation. Forf urther discussion, see Wringe 2006 ,2 010,2 014.  On the other hand, while the relationship between collective responsibility and individual responsibility maybeobscure, it is not,and is not generallythoughttobe, non-existent.: It would go against the judgment of manyinvolvedinsuch proteststosay that they bore no responsibility for the actions of their government; and it would make little sense of manypeople'sview that as citizens of acountry engaged in an illegal war,they bore aspecial responsibility for stoppingit. wide climate change. We might disagree about what,i fa nything,s uch an obligation requires of ac itizen of ah istoricallyu nder-developedc ountry;a nA merican teenager; aNorwegianOld AgePensioner and the loneparent of adevelopmentally-disabled child.
One might replyt hat if politics is concernedwith collective action, political philosophers qua political philosophers need not worry if the implications of a claim about collective responsibility for the actions of individuals are unclear. However,e veni fp olitical questions typicallyt aket he form 'What should/can/ must/we do',t he question 'What should/can/must I do' is more fundamental. 'We' can do nothing,without some 'I' or some 'I'sdoing something.Soifthe notion of collective obligation is to playacentral role within political philosophy, we must address the implications of such obligations for individuals.Ishall argue, then, that some kinds of forward-lookingglobal obligation give rise to obligations on individuals to bring into existencei nstitutions which can enable those obligations to be met.
3G lobalc ollective obligations: The very idea
Suppose, as manyh ave, that the notion of ac ollective obligation is coherent (French 1984; May 1987; Copp 2006; Pettit 2007; Isaacs 2011) .⁵ We maystill wonder what kinds of entities can be the subjects of collective obligations. Entities which have af ormal organizational structure, such as nation-states,b usiness corporations and smaller bodies such as committees within alargerorganization are obvious candidates (Gilbert 2008; French 1984; Copp 2006) . However,Ihave argued elsewherethatgroups which do not possess aformal structure of this sort can also be the subject of collective obligations (Wringeforthcoming,2010 (Wringeforthcoming, ,2006 cf. also Isaacs 2011, chapters 1, 2a nd 5) . One unstructuredc ollective which is particularlyi nteresting here is the collective consistingo fe veryone currently alive:w hat one might call the 'global collective'.
There are good reasons for thinking that some this collective bears significant moral obligations (Nussbaum 2006;W ringe2 006).⁶ Consider aw ell- Form yo wn views see Wringe2 006,2 010a, and forthcomingF rench 1984,M ay 1987, Copp 2006 ,P ettit 2007 Isaacs 2011 .  Not everyone would accept that the population of the world does constitutea nu nstructured collective of the sort Is uggest here.O ne reason for this has been explored in detail by Pogge (Pogge2001) whosuggests that global economic interconnectedness makesthe world'spopulation part of as tructured political community.Whether or not Poggei sc orrect,Ithink the argument from the natureofrights suggests that it makes sense to think of therebeingcollective obGlobal CollectiveO bligations, Just International Institutions and Pluralism known objectiontothe notion of subsistence rights, conceivedofasrights on the parts of individuals to have certain basic needs attended to (O'Neill [1986] 1998). It is oftensuggested that if such rights existed, they would necessarilygiverise to obligations on agents to see to it thatsuch needs are fulfilled (or,more plausibly to see to it that individuals acquire the capacity to meet these needs). However,it is often not plausible thatthis obligation falls either on some individual human being or on anysalient organized collective body. Take for example the case of a starving individual in adrought-stricken regionofafailed state such as Somalia. It mayb eq uite implausible to think that anyp articulari ndividual has an obligation to do something about her fate:e veryone nearbyw ho is in ap osition to help maybeinasimilar plight.I tmay alsobetrue that the most obvious collective bodies are in no position to help either.Their state, for example, maylack the resources, the organizational capacity,orthe territorial control which would be required to do anything about theirs ituation.⁷
We ought not to sayt hati ndividuals in such circumstances do not have the rights that more fortunately placed individuals -for example, those who are in a position to be helpedbytheir compatriots -do have.Todosowould in effect be to saythat the protection that rights are supposed to afford individuals lapses in situations wherethey need it most.⁸ An alternative is to seeobligations as falling on aglobalcollective.⁹ The globalcollective bodyacts as what one might call an 'obligation-bearer of lastresort'.The existenceofcollective obligations which fall on this bodyisthus something which can be taken to be apresupposition of the claim that there is aright to have certain kinds of basic needsmet.Wehavehere ligations on the world'sp opulationc onsideredi na bstraction from anyp olitical structuret hat might fall on them (just as it might makes ense to think of ag roup of individuals whow ere in fact the membersofaparticular cluborsocial group havingcertain obligations when consideredasaparticular social organized group, and other obligations in virtue of some other form of social organization, or in virtue of their beingplaced in such away as to enable them to act together collectively to address some pressing need. Forf urther discussion of Pogge'sv iew see Meckled-Garcia 2008 , Wringe 2010b .  Foru seful discussion see also Griffin 2008 . Sreenivasan 2012 has recentlya ppealed to an argument alongs imilar lines in defenceo ft he claim that therei sn oh uman right to health.  Of course the protection that rights provide is onlym etaphorical. Rights can onlyp rotect individuals to the extent that individuals act in accordancew ith the obligations that those rights generate. But what would be entailedbythe suggestion that people in desperatecircumstances have fewer rights is not this uncontroversial claim, but that these individuals would be deprived of the protections which rights can, and should, provide.  See Wringe2 006 for arguments that this is the best wayo fa voidingt he conclusion; and in particular that collective obligations fallingonother bodies provide aless satisfactorysolution.
what is effectively at ranscendental argument for the existenceo fo bligations falling on ar elatively unstructured body -namely ag lobal collective.
4AProblem -The agency objection
Some authorshold that unstructured groups like the global collective cannot be the bearers of collective obligations because they are not collective agents.¹⁰ We might express theiro bjection as follows:
(AgencyA rgument) (P1) Onlygroups with acertain kind of internal structureare capable of collective action. (P2) Onlyg roups that arec apable of collective action can have collective obligations. CU nstructured groups cannot be the subject of collective obligation.
The first premiss of this argument is questionable. The phenomenon of collective action has been analysed in different ways by different authors. Some accounts of collective action requireacollective agent with ac ertain amount of internal structures but others, such as Christopher Kutz's 'minimalist' account do not (List/Pettit 2011; F rench 1984; G ilbert 1989; K utz 2000a,2 000b ). In the absence of detailed argument about the natureo fc ollective action we cannot simply make an inferencef rom lack of formal structure to the incapacity for agency.
The second premiss is also problematic. Several authors, includingI saacs, Collinsand Lawford-Smith appear to takeitt obeself-evident(Isaacs 2011;Lawford-Smith 2012; Collins2 013). In fact,i ti sh ighlyc ontentious. For, as Ia rgue elsewhere, the existenceofcollective obligations does not requirethat the collective on whom the obligation falls be an agent but onlythat some agent or agents be answerable for the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of the obligation (Wringe 2010a ). In the case of obligations which fall on unstructured groups,the agents in question are typicallysome or all of thosewho make up the group in question (Wringe2 010a.) Does the second premiss of the argument follow from the claim that 'Ought implies Can'?Itwould if we accepted the claim that onlyagents have the capacity to carry out the actions which are necessary for ac ollective obligations to be fulfilled. However,i fw et hink that some collectivesa re potentiallya gents without actuallybeing agents, then this claim seems false. Foritseems plausible that  Isaacs 2011 chapter 1, Lawford-Smith 2012 and Collins (forthcoming) all endorse the claim that onlyc ollectivesw hich arec apableo fa gencyc an be the subjectso fc ollective obligation. Fora na rgument against this view see Wringe 2010a.
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if ac ollective is ap otential agent,i th as the capacity to do anyo ft he thingsi t would have the capacity to do if it werea ppropriatelyo rganized.¹¹ (The general principle involved here is that if Iamcapable of acquiringthe capacity to do Xby acertain time, then, in the onlysense of can which is of interest here, Ican do it. It is in this sense, for example, that one might judge that the students who are being taught by ap articular teacher can pass the final exam which she devised at the beginning of the semester,and that thosewho are in receipt of ascholarship stand under am oral obligation to do so.)
5C onnecting individuala nd collective organizations
What bearing does the existenceo faglobalo bligation to satisfy subsistence needs have on questions about what particular individuals should do in particular concrete situations?C learlyi tc annot give rise to an obligation on each individual to satisfy everyone'ss ubsistence needs. No individual can do this. Indeed, the fact that no individual can do this, taken together with the claim that ought implies can, is preciselywhat supports the claim that there is aglobal collective obligation here. However,this does not mean that global obligations cannot give rise to any obligations on individuals.¹² This would be to overlook the possibility that collec- LawfordS mith (2012) has argued that this is not the case: she suggests that in general an unorganised groupdoes not have the capacity to do things which it could do if organised, simply because it mayb es od ifficultf or the group to organise itself. She citesi nc onnection with this case the German armyunder Hitler which (she claims) did not have the capacity to bringHitler down even though it could have done so if appropriatelyorganised. Herreason for denyingthis is to exempt the army(considered as acollective)fromblame in this context. However,itisnot clear to me that Lawford-Smith draws the right lesson from this example: it seems just as plausible to hold that the armya sa ni nstitution was culpable even though, perhaps, no individual servinginitwas (sincethey were, she claims,not in apositiontobereasonablysurethat others would have co-operated with them). One reasonthat it might makesense to do so would be that one could regard the structureo rcharacter of the German armya sbeingt ob lame in this case. Doings oh elps to makes ense of certain kinds of reactive attitude that one might have in this case: for example one might think that the armyd eserved contempt, while reserving judgment on whethera ny particular individuals did.  My interest at this point is in what,i np rinciple, individuals would have to do in order to fulfil the collective obligations which fall upon groups of which they areamember.I ti sas eparate, and important question, and one which Ih avea ddressed as to whetherthey arecapable of doingso, and in particular,how we oughttounderstand claims of collective capacity in this tive obligations can give rise to obligations on individuals that are slightlym ore complex than those which we have considered so far.Ihave argued elsewhere that collective obligations can give rise to individual obligations without being reducible to them. In particular, Ih aved efended the following claim:
(C to I) If in aparticular situation acollective Chas an all-out obligationtoPhi,then, for anymember MofC,and for anyset Sofpossible actions of members of Cthat,ifperformed together, would constituteC'sPhi-ing,ifSincludes M'sdoing A, then Mhas apro tantoobligation to do A.¹³ (Roughly speaking,Cto Isaysthatifthere is some wayfor members of acollective to act which will ensure the collective of which they are amember will do the thing it is obliged to do, then each of the members has apro tanto obligation to act in that way.)
Ct oIis ap rinciple connectinga ll-out collective obligations with pro tanto obligations on individuals. David Copp has argued that therea re no plausible principles that will enable us to derive all-out obligations on individuals from all-out obligations on collectives. But his arguments do not touch the principle which Ih aved efended.¹⁴
Ishall not attempt to rehearse the argument for CtoIhere. Instead Ishalltry to show that if we accept Ct oI ,w ec an derivef rom it two further principles, which are somewhat more concrete in their implications for individuals.
(Organizational Principle 1) OP 1: Astringent obligation which falls on ac ollective,a nd which can onlybef ulfilled by collective action of asort that is unlikelytocome about in aspontaneous and uncoordinated manner generates an obligation on each of the memberso ft hat collective to promote modes of organization that would enable the obligation to be carried out,t ot he extent that it is in their powert op romotes uch forms of obligation.
(Organizational Principle 2) OP 2: Astringent obligation which falls on acollective which is organized in such away as to enable the co-ordination of collective actions that satisfy global obligations generates a protantoobligation on individuals whoform part of that collective to act in ways which are necessary for the fulfilment of those obligations.
context. See in particular Wringe2010,a nd for further critical discussiono ft he view Ip ut forwardt here, Pinkert 2014,L awford-Smith 2015.  Ia mi ndebted to David Copp for useful discussion of this issue (though he should not be blamed for the formulation Ih aves ettled on).  Forf urther discussion see Wringe (forthcoming).
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Both these principles requirefurther explication. Forexample, much more needs to be said about which obligations are 'stringent obligations' and whyboth principles are restricted to the caseofstringent obligations. The occurrence of the notion of astringent obligation in these principles will also make adifference to the question of what counts as an adequate argument for them. Anysuch argument will at am inimum have to explain whyi to nlya pplies to stringent obligations; ideallyi ts hould also saysomething about whether there are anyr elated principles which applyt on on-stringent obligations.
The intuitive case for restrictingthe principles in some wayisfairlyobvious: there would be something wrongw ith ap rinciple thatg enerated, or threatened to generate, an eed for aw orld state out of ap ossiblec ollective obligation to avoid littering sidewalks. The words tringent acts, to thate xtent as something of ap lace-holder.H owever,Ishall take an obligation to be stringent provided that failingtomeet it would resultalarge number of significant violations of individuals' basic rights, whereIuse the term basic right in Henry Shue'ssense to mean aright which individuals must have in order for anyfurther assignment of rights to them to have anyp oint (Shue [1980] 
996).¹⁵
This characterization of stringencys till leavest he content of OP 1a nd OP 2 somewhat indeterminate. Further specification would involved iscussion of which rights are basic rights; of what counts as a 'significant' violation of them; and how manysuch violationsare required to generate astringent obligation. These are all important issues, which Ic annot pursue here. Even when these lacunaea re acknowledged, it seems plausible that ag ood argument for OP 1a nd OP 2w ould go some wayt owardss howing how claims about global obligation might give rise to relatively contentful requirementsfor action relating to particulari ndividuals.¹⁶ OP 1a nd OP 2d on ot give rise to putative obligations on individuals which those individuals are unable to satisfy.Furthermore, they appear to be capable of  Shue argues -correctlyi nm yv iew -that such rights must include both rights to ab asic level of subsistencea nd to ac ertain level of personal security.F or further discussion, see Beitz/Goodin 2009.  Although Ishall be providingarguments in favour of OP 1and OP 2, Ishall not be claiming that they provide us with the full story about the ways in which globalo bligations might filter down to the individual level. One reason for this is that OP 2fails to generate anyobligations on individuals in situationsw here there is moret han one wayf or ac ollective to carry out its collective obligations -as will often be the case. Nevertheless,asuccessful argument for them would at least show how claims about globalo bligation might give rise to substantive claims about the obligations of individuals.
providings ome kind of guidance concerning the ways in which particulari ndividuals should act in particular concrete circumstances.
6D eriving OP 1a nd OP 2
How do OP 1a nd OP 2f ollow from Ct oI ?
OP 1a ddresses situations whereacollective has an obligation which is extremelyu nlikelyt ob em et by spontaneous action on the part of its members. Furthermore, if collective obligations are constrained by the principle that 'oughti mpliesc an',t hen such obligations can be met by some combination of actions. If the obligations cannot be met by spontaneous action, yetc an be met in some way, then the wayt hey can be met is, presumably, by means of organized action. But organization of the required sort does not come out of nowhere: it needst ob ep ut in place by the action of individuals.S oi fac ollective can onlysolve aproblem by acting in an organized manner,itcan onlysolve that problem by doing what is required to organize itself in the requisitem anner.
It follows that if acollective has aduty which it cannot fulfil without organized action, then the ways in which it can meet thatobligation involveorganizing itself in the right way.¹⁷ If there is aduty on the part of the individuals that make up the collective to act in ways which would enable them to fulfil the obligation, and these ways involveo rganizing themselvesi np articular ways,t hen, according to Ct oIthey have ap ro tanto duty to organize themselvesi nt hese ways.
But this is what OP 1s ays.
Ih aves aid that collectivest hat are unlikelyt ob ea ble to meet their obligations in virtue of the spontaneous actions of individuals who make up the collective maybea ble to meet them by organizingthemselves. Is the onlypossibility? In principle it seems as though it might not be. Acollective might acquirethe sort of organization required for meeting its obligations not by organizing itself, but by having some form of organization imposed on it from outside. Suppose the citizensofanation comprehensively defeated in war have acollective obligation to institute some form of order which willperform the basic functions of astate (as one might hold, of the people of Germanyi n1 945) (Wringe2 010a).¹⁸ Sometimes the required kind of order maybelikeliest to come through being externally imposed.
 Or perhaps acquiescingi nh avings uch af orm of organization imposedu pon it: see below.  It hank my colleagueL ars Vinx for suggestingt his example.
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This possibility is clearlyi rrelevant to the main kind of case that Ih avei n mind here -thatofthe global collective.Here, thereisex hypothesi nothing outside the collective which could imposet he requisitef orm of organization on it. However,the possibilitymight be thought to throw some doubt on the argument Ihavegiven for OP 2. Nonetheless, Idonot think it should. In general, the chances of some external bodyimposing on acollective bodyjustthe forms of organization that it needs to fulfil its collective obligations (as opposed to serving the interests of those who are imposing thatform of order)seems small enough to be discounted. It maybeoptimistic, but it does not seem to be undulyoptimistic, to suppose thati ng eneral unstructured collective bodies are more likelyt om eet their obligations by finding their own form of organization than by having some form of organization imposed upon them from outside OP 2i sm orec omplicated. However,i nm ost cases in which ac ollective is organized in such aw ay as to enable an obligation to be met,i ts eems likely that the wayt he obligation is most likelyt ob em et will involvet he individuals acting in accordance with the forms of organization that alreadyexist and which would enable them to meet the obligations. (Itneed not be the onlyway:perhaps the institutions we have are sufficient to enable us to fulfil acertain duty,but are not the onlyones which could enable us to do so.) Changingforms of organization is complicated, time-consuminga nd unpredictable: in most cases obligations which could be met by ac hanged form of organization are less likelyt o be met in thatw ay.S oi nm ostc ases ap ro tanto duty to act in accordance with existingo rganizations to meet givenc ollective obligations will not be outweighed by ac ompetinga nd incompatible duty to come up with other forms of organization.
In oted in section 4t hat OP 1a nd OP 2w eres tated in terms of 'stringent' collective obligations (and Ia lso noticed ac oncomitant argumentativeb urden of explaining whyt his should be so). Nothingi nt he argument that Ih ave givensofar provides such an explanation. In fact,the argument seems to justify much more inclusive principles, applying to all collective obligations, and not merelyt os tringent ones. This might even be taken as an objection to the arguments: the objection would be that if the arguments givenare correct,our collective obligations give rise to too manyobligations on individuals to be plausible.
My response is that the argument does provide support for versions of OP 1 and OP 2which are not limited to stringent obligations. However,Ihave also argued thatt he obligations on individuals which these collective obligations give rise to are onlyp ro tanto duties,a nd that in some cases these pro tanto duties might have aw eightt hat is so low as to mean that they are almost always over-ridden. The point of restrictingO P1and OP 2d uties to situations where the obligations involved are quite stringent is thati ti sp lausible that in these cases -and to afar lesser extent in other cases -the pro tanto duties generated by our collective obligations are likelyt ob es tronge nough not to be generally over-ridden by countervailingc onsiderations.
7A no bjection
In section 6Iarguedfor two principles concerning the obligations of individuals to support international arrangements. However,o ne might object that OP 2i s undulyc onservative.F or OP 2d irects us to support existing institutions insofar as they are capable of allowing us to satisfy our global obligations rather than, for example, devoting our energiestobringingabout new forms of organisation. But it maythen requireus, wrongly, to support institutional arrangementswhich are themselvesu njust.
There are three distinct questions which we might want to consider here. The first is whether OP 2would require us to support unjust institutionalstructures in some possible worldorother.Asecond is whether OP 2would require us to support unjust institutional structures in the world as it actuallyi s. And at hird question is whether either of these two possibilities would constituteg rounds for rejectingO P2 ,a nd hence the line of argument which supports it.
Ishall start by considering the last of these questions. One might think that if OP 2w ould give us ad uty to support unjust institutions in anycircumstances whatsoever then this would give us compellingg rounds for rejecting it.A nd it seems at least possible to imagine that there might be such grounds.S uppose we have good reasons to think that there is ag lobal collective obligation to prevent irreversible climate changeofas ort which will have catastrophic implicationsfor unborn generations. We can certainlyimagine circumstances in which the institutions which exist and which are capable of averting such at hreat might be ones which engagedi np ractices which wereo bviouslyu njust,s uch as extracting forced labour from randomlyc hosen citizens. Does this establish that OP 2i su nacceptable? Id on ot think so. There are two reasons whynot.First,itissimplynot clear that it is arequirement on principles of justicet hat they should yield intuitively acceptable resultsi nall possible situations. Perhaps there are predicaments thata re sufficientlyf ar removed from our ownc ircumstances that we are simplyn ot very good at figuring out what would be the right thing to do if we found ourselvesi nt hem. If there are, then the fact that aputative principle yields intuitively unacceptable results in them should not count against the principle. Perhaps our intuitive sense of what would be right and wrongi ns uch as ituation is misleading in ways which would become apparent to us if we ever face such as ituation, but which are difficult to getasense of when we are simplyimaginingasparselydescribed philosophicalt hought experiment.
The second reason whyO P2might ground an obligation to support unjust institutions in some possible circumstances is that OP 2onlygives us prima facie reasons to support certain kinds of institutional structure. It is consistent with this that the institutions' in question being extremelyu njust might conceivably give us reasons for not supportings uch institutions which outweighed those prima facie reasons.Ifso, we would not have shown that OP 2had anyobviously unacceptable consequences even in these counterfactual circumstances.
Let us instead concentrate on whether OP 2gives us an obligation to support unjust institutions in the actual world, and whether ap ositive answer to this question would provide reasons for findingO P2dubious.H eret he news is less good. Forwemight think that OP 2requires us to support unjust institutions in the actual world. If so, it is much harder to arguet hat the fact that OP 2h as intuitivelyu nacceptable consequences is unimportant.
Thomas Poggeh as argued thatw orld poverty involves the violation of the human rights -including, importantly,t he liberty rights of al arge proportion of the world'sp oor.I np articular,h ea rgues thatt he current international economic framework, incorporating as it does such thingsasstate sovereignty privileges, plays an importantrole in allowing these rights to be violated. (I focus on the passivehere, rather thanonPogge'sview that we are actively involved in violating these rights, because Ia mi nterested in questions about institutional frameworks.) It mays till be thatt he existing economic system should be one which is capable of allowing for political actiont oa ddress,s ay our globalo bligation to see that the subsistencerights of all human beings are met. If so, then OP 2w ould give us reason to support an unjust institutional order in the actual world. Thiss eems like as ubstantial and serious objection.
When consideringw hether OP 2m ight have unacceptable consequences in some otherp ossible world, Ie mphasized thatO P2onlyg aver ise to a prima facie duty to support certain kinds of institution; and Is uggested that there might be countervailingobligations not to participateinunjust institutions which would outweigh this prima facie duty.H owever,this response is liable to seem somewhat thin when we are consideringt he implications of OP 2f or our actuallye xisting institutions. In this context it would be good to have some idea of what this countervailingd uty might be. In ow turn to this issue.
8H ow to develop institutions
Ih avea rgued that there are global collective obligations, thatt hese obligations give rise to prima facie obligations on individuals to institute and promoteforms of globalorganisation which would enable these global collective obligations to be met.I f, as seems plausible, global poverty involves the violation of human rights, the institutions which are required here willi nclude institutions which aim at preventing and rectifyingdistributive injustices. However,Ihave also argued thatthis prima facie obligation is likelytogiveusanobligation to support institutional frameworks which actuallyexist,evenifthese frameworks are ones which, in practice, enable substantial injustice. Ih avea lso argued that this unattractive aspect of my view might be mitigated to some extent if thereweresome kind of countervailingd uty which could over-ride it.
Three thingss eemn ecessary here. The first is to says omething about what this countervailingduty might be; the second is to explain whyweshould think that such aduty exists; and the third is to saysomething more detailed about the ways in which this kind of duty might interact with the problematic parts of OP 2.
As far as the content of the duty is concerned, notice that OP 2saysthat we have aprima facie duty to support institutionalframeworks which would enable our collective global obligations to be met. But the word 'support' is very nonspecific: there are manydifferent ways in which one can support an institution; or rather,there are manydifferent activities thatcould count as forms of support. (Tothe extent that Ipay my taxes and shop in supermarkets,Iamarguablythereby supportingt he existing international political and economic system. But there are other thingsw hich Ic ould do which make my support more or less whole-hearted.) We should also notice thatinstitutions of all sorts are not static: they are constantlysubject to forces thatlead them to develop in one wayrather than another.F urthermore, it is arguable that in order for anyexistingset of institutions to actualize its capacity for meeting our collective obligations it would need to develop, and to develop in some ways rather than others.
So OP 2iscompatible with the existenceofafurther obligation -namelyan obligation to develop institutions in ways which make them more,r ather than less just. If there is such an obligation, we should probablyt hink of it as being something likeaKantian 'imperfect duty'-one wherew eh aveacertain amount of discretion about how and to what extent we are goingt of ulfil it.I t would surelyb ea bsurdt ot hink that each of us should be responsible for promoting the development of all the institutions in which they participatei nt he direction of greater justice. However,e vena ni mperfect duty of this sort would seem to be enough to mitigate the problematic aspects of OP 2.
